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1. Introduction
To model the behavior of U.S. in°ation, researchers typically use some version of the New
Keynesian Phillips curve, a relation that states that the current domestic in°ation rate depends
on expectations about future in°ation and on a measure of resource utilization in the economy.
The rapid increase in the pace of global economic integration in recent years, however, has
led a number of researchers, policymakers, and commentators to argue that these conventional
Phillips curves, which were derived under the assumption of a closed-economy, may have
become obsolete. Not only, in fact, globalization may have contributed to lower the level
of in°ation in recent decades, but it may have also deeply altered the form of the Phillips
curve. First, several studies have documented how globalization may a®ect the slope of the
curve (although the sign of the e®ect is still controversial, as Rogo®, 2003, 2006, claims that
globalization should lead to a steeper curve, while Razin and Loungani, 2005 and Razin and
Binyamini, 2007, show analytically that openness to trade causes the Phillips curve to become
°atter). Moreover, others have argued that globalization may have even deeper implications
by making in°ation mostly a function of global { rather than domestic { economic conditions.
Borio and Filardo (2007) estimate reduced-form in°ation equations and o®er evidence that
\global slack" has become a signi¯cant determinant of U.S. in°ation in the post-1985 sample
(while domestic slack appears to have become irrelevant). Ihrig et al. (2007) use a similar
reduced-form econometric approach, but ¯nd opposite results.
This paper aims to contribute to the debate about the consequences of globalization by
providing empirical evidence on the e®ect of global output on U.S. in°ation. While Borio
and Filardo (2007) and Ihrig et al. (2007) use backward-looking single-equation regressions in
their empirical analysis, this paper tries to assess whether global output a®ects the U.S. econ-
omy using a microfounded general equilibrium model, which is estimated by full-information
Bayesian techniques. The model is based on Clarida, Gal¶ ³, and Gertler (2002, hereafter CGG)
and Woodford (2007)'s two-country setting and it incorporates potential e®ects from global
output on the aggregate demand and supply blocks of the economy. By using a general equi-
librium model, the paper can provide a di®erent way to control for some factors { as the
possible endogeneity of global output to U.S. output, the simultaneous e®ects of global out-
put on domestic output and in°ation, the various in°uences of domestic monetary policy and2 FABIO MILANI
disturbances, and so forth { that can a®ect the estimated size of the elasticity of in°ation to
global slack.
One factor that has emerged in the literature as possibly important in accounting for the
divergence in the results is the treatment of in°ation expectations. Expectations here are
formed from the general equilibrium model's solution, while previous studies assumed either
a smooth trend to account for expectations (Borio and Filardo, 2007) or a backward-looking
Phillips curve (Ihrig et al., 2007).
The paper relaxes the assumption of rational expectations and allows economic agents to
form subjective, although near-rational, expectations, and to learn the parameters of the econ-
omy over time (the assumed learning process is in the spirit of Marcet and Sargent, 1989,
and Evans and Honkapohja, 2001). In this way, the paper tries to disentangle the e®ect of
global output on the economy from the extent to which it a®ects the evolution of expectations.
Moreover, learning allows the model to match the persistence in in°ation and output with-
out changing the model's microfoundations to include features as indexation in price-setting
and habit formation in consumption. Having a framework that is able to match the inertia
in macroeconomic data is crucial, since it is possible that a large role for global output can
simply arise because it captures the omitted persistence in the system.
Adding learning to the model may lead to worries about whether we enter the \wilderness of
irrationality". Therefore, here the learning process is not arbitrarily chosen and the estimation
results conditioned on its validity. Instead, the best-¯tting learning process is inferred from
the data along with all the structural parameters. The estimation remains parsimonious as
the only free learning parameter is the constant gain.
The main scope of the empirical analysis is to assess the e®ect of global output on the
U.S. economy. In particular, the empirical estimates can shed some light on the recent argu-
ment that closed-economy Phillips curves should be abandoned in favor of more global-centric
speci¯cations.
The posterior estimates are suggestive of small and slightly negative values for the sensitivity
of in°ation to global output. When this coe±cient is restricted to zero the ¯t of the model
improves. Therefore, there doesn't seem to be much evidence that the New Keynesian Phillips
curve should be altered yet to assign a central role to global output as a driver of domestic
in°ation rates. Global output may still play a role, however, as the estimates indicate thatGLOBAL OUTPUT AND U.S. INFLATION 3
it a®ects domestic output through the IS equation. The models that incorporate an in°uence
of global output on domestic output, but neither on the Phillips curve nor on expectations,
achieve the best ¯t of the data. Other versions of the open economy model, instead, fail to
improve the ¯t over the standard closed-economy speci¯cation.
Shocks to global output account for a very limited fraction of U.S. economic °uctuations.
There is no evidence that economic agents would improve their forecasting performance about
in°ation by exploiting information about global conditions, while these may slightly improve
forecasts about domestic output.
The paper mainly aims to contribute to the literature that studies the e®ects of global factors
on U.S. in°ation. Besides Borio and Filardo (2007) and Ihrig et al. (2007), other papers by
Gamber and Hung (2001), Wynne and Kersting (2007), and Milani (2009a) provide some sup-
portive evidence on the global slack hypothesis, while Tootell (1998) and Ball (2006) ¯nd either
limited or no role for foreign capacity utilization as a determinant of U.S. in°ation.
1 Castel-
nuovo (2007) focuses, instead, on the in°uence of global slack on U.S. in°ation expectations,
¯nding it unimportant in the post-Volcker sample. This paper reaches similar conclusions.
D'Agostino and Surico (2009) identify global liquidity, rather than capacity utilization, as an-
other global factor that may a®ect domestic in°ation. Several papers focus, instead, on the
impact of globalization on the slope of the domestic Phillips curve and on the level of in°ation:
Sbordone (2007), for example, models how the increased competition induced by globalization
may a®ect the slope of the Phillips curve; Guerrieri et al. (2008) derive an open economy
New Keynesian Phillips curve under the assumption of a variable elasticity of demand and
show that an increase in foreign competition leads to lower in°ation. Zaniboni (2008) uses
calibration to study the e®ects of globalization on the level of in°ation, on the slope of the
Phillips curve, and on the sensitivity of in°ation to global slack. His conclusion of a limited
impact of globalization on in°ation are supported by the empirical results in this paper.
This paper can also be seen as an empirical application of models with adaptive learning
(e.g., Evans and Honkaphja, 2001, for an overview). The constant gain and the initial beliefs
coe±cients are all estimated from the data, rather than ¯xed a priori, and di®erent learning
speci¯cations are estimated and chosen based on ¯t. The empirical results illustrate the evo-
lution of agents' beliefs in the post-1985 sample in the U.S. and conclude that they were not
1Calza (2008) and Milani (2009b) also ¯nd results that are not entirely supportive of the global slack hy-
pothesis, but focusing on the Euro area and the set of G-7 countries, respectively.4 FABIO MILANI
sensitive to global developments. Other papers that incorporate learning to ¯t macroeconomic
data are Adam (2005), Milani (2007a,b, 2008a,b), and Slobodyan and Wouters (2007). Finally,
the paper can provide evidence on whether the closed-economy settings that have been typically
estimated as a description of the U.S. economy (e.g., Ireland, 2001, Giannoni and Woodford,
2003, Rabanal and Rubio-Ramirez, 2005, Smets and Wouters, 2007, An and Schorfheide, 2007)
may have now become misspeci¯ed because of the omission of global factors.
2. A Two-Country Framework
The e®ect of global output on U.S. macroeconomic variables is investigated using the two-
country New Keynesian model derived in CGG (2002). Woodford (2007) uses a similar setting
to evaluate the impact of globalization on the e®ectiveness of national monetary policies.
2 In
the model, the U.S. are regarded as the Home country, while an aggregate of several of its
trading partners represents the Foreign block.

















where 0 < ¯ < 1 denotes the household's discount factor, ¾ > 0 denotes the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution in consumption, ' > 0 is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor
supply, ³t is an aggregate preference shock, Ht denotes hours of work, and Ct is an index of






where CH;t is a Dixit-Stiglitz index of Home-produced goods and CF;t is an index of Foreign-
produced goods. The coe±cient ° denotes the share of foreign-produced goods in the domestic
consumption basket (households in both countries are assumed to consume an identical basket
of goods).3 As in CGG (2002), this speci¯cation assumes a unit elasticity of substitution
2A similar framework has also been used in Benigno and Benigno (2006, 2008) to study issues related to
international monetary cooperation. This section will simply sketch the main features of the model; full details
on the derivation can be found in the original papers.
3The model is presented here under the assumption of rational expectations. Near-rational expectations
and learning will be introduced later in the model. The log-linearized laws of motion under rational expecta-
tions and learning will be equivalent under the conditions discussed in Honkapohja, Mitra, and Evans (2003).
Preston (2008) and Milani (2006) o®er a di®erent approach of incorporating learning in which in¯nite-horizon
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between Home and Foreign goods. Financial markets are complete. Optimization gives the
following intra- and intertemporal ¯rst-order conditions
PH;tCH;t = (1 ¡ °)PtCt (2.3)









= (1 + it)¡1; (2.5)




F;t denotes the aggregate price level, k ´ (1 ¡ °)1¡°°°, and PH;t and
PF;t are price indices for domestically and foreign-produced goods.
A continuum of monopolistically-competitive ¯rms also populates the economy; each ¯rm
produces the di®erentiated good i according to the production function
yt(i) = Atht(i)Á¡1
(2.6)
where At denotes technology, ht(i) denotes the labor input for ¯rm i, and Á ¸ 1 allows for
diminishing returns to the labor input. Firms are assumed to set prices µ a la Calvo (i.e., in a
given period a ¯rm has a probability ® of not being able to revise its price). When allowed
to revise their price, ¯rms select the new optimal price pt(i) by maximizing the expected


















, where Qt;T denotes the sto-
chastic discount factor, Wt denotes the nominal wage, Yt denotes aggregate domestic output,
and µ > 1 denotes the elasticity of substitution among di®erentiated goods. Pro¯t maximiza-





®T¡tQt;T [pt(i) ¡ ¹MCT(i)] = 0
)
(2.8)
where ¹ ´ µ=(µ¡1) denotes the ¯rm's markup of prices over marginal costs and MCt(i) denotes
the nominal marginal cost for ¯rm i, which can be expressed as MCt(i) = MCt (yt(i)=Yt)
Á¡1,
where MCt is the average marginal cost for domestic ¯rms. The stochastic discount factor and
4The paper assumes producer-currency pricing. The impact of globalization on the Phillips curve in the
alternative assumptions of local-currency pricing and dollar-dominant pricing have been analyzed in Zaniboni
(2008).6 FABIO MILANI


































where ! ´ [(1 + ')Á ¡ 1] and ±t is a measure of price dispersion for domestic goods. Through
its e®ect on the stochastic discount factor and on marginal costs in (2.9) and (2.10), therefore,
foreign (or global) output Y ¤
t will a®ect the aggregate supply block of the economy, which is
obtained by log-linearizing the ¯rst-order condition (2.8) along with the law of motion for the
domestic price index P1¡µ
H;t = ®P1¡µ
H;t¡1 + (1 ¡ ®)pt(i)1¡µ, where pt(i) is the same for each ¯rm
i that reoptimizes in t. The sign of the global output impact on marginal costs is, however,
ambiguous as a result of two countervailing e®ects: a positive e®ect, since an increase in
foreign output leads in the model to higher domestic consumption, lower marginal utilities of
consumption and income, and higher marginal costs, and a negative e®ect, since an increase
in foreign output also causes an appreciation of the Home country's terms of trade, a higher
relative marginal utility of income in units of domestic goods with respect to the marginal
utility in units of the world goods, and hence lower marginal costs.
2.1. Linearized Model. After log-linearization of the model's equilibrium conditions around
a zero-in°ation steady state, the U.S. economy can be summarized by the following equations
(as in Woodford, 2007):
¼t = ¯ ^ Et¼t+1 + ·Hyt + ·Fy¤
t + ut (2.11)
yt = ^ Etyt+1 + #
³
y¤





it ¡ ^ Et¼t+1
´
+ ´t (2.12)
it = ½it¡1 + (1 ¡ ½)[Â¼¼t¡1 + Âyyt¡1] + "t: (2.13)
Equation (2.11) is a New Keynesian Phillips curve (extended to the open economy case), in
which the domestic in°ation rate ¼t depends on the expected one-period ahead in°ation rate
and on both domestic and foreign output (denoted by yt and y¤
t). ¯ denotes the household's
discount factor, while coe±cients ·H and ·F denote the sensitivity of in°ation to domestic
and global output. Global output enters the aggregate supply relation through its e®ect on
the marginal utility of income and on ¯rms' marginal costs. This Phillips curve is similar to
the speci¯cations estimated in Borio and Filardo (2007) and Ihrig et al. (2007), which are,GLOBAL OUTPUT AND U.S. INFLATION 7
however, purely backward-looking: Borio and Filardo (2007) use a smooth trend for in°ation
to proxy for changing in°ation expectations and lagged values for domestic and global slack
variables, while Ihrig et al. (2007) use lagged in°ation as a proxy for expectations and current
slack measures. Here, the formation of expectations will be explicitly modeled. One of the
main coe±cient of interest in the estimation will be ·F. Borio and Filardo (2007)'s estimate
for ·F is positive, large, and signi¯cant, while ·H is not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero; Ihrig
et al. (2007), instead, ¯nd negative estimates for ·F (with a large standard error).
Equation (2.12) is the log-linearized Euler equation. Domestic output depends on expecta-
tions about future output, on the ex-ante real interest rate (it ¡ ^ Et¼t+1), and on current and
expected foreign output. Foreign output a®ects the economy's IS curve since domestic house-
holds are assumed to consume a basket that includes both domestically and foreign-produced
goods. The coe±cients # and ~ ¾ denote the sensitivity of domestic output to foreign output
and domestic real interest rates.
Monetary policy in the model is described by the Taylor rule (2.13). The policy instrument
it is adjusted in response to °uctuations in in°ation and output, and it is characterized by
inertial adjustment (the rule is operational in the sense of McCallum, 1999, since the monetary
authority is assumed to dispose of information up to t ¡ 1 when setting policy in t); Â¼ and
Ây denote the policy reaction coe±cients to in°ation and output, while ½ captures the inertia
of central bank's policy.
The variable ut denotes a cost-push shock, ´t denotes a demand shock (preference or gov-
ernment spending), and "t is a policy shock. The supply and demand shocks are assumed
to evolve as AR(1) processes ut = ½uut¡1 + ºu
t and ´t = ½´´t¡1 + º
´




Normally-distributed with mean zero and standard deviations ¾u and ¾´, while the policy
shock "t is assumed to be i.i.d. Normal with mean zero and standard deviation ¾".
The foreign economy is not modeled as structural (if it was, it would follow a system of
equations similar to (2.11) to (2.13)).5 Global output, however, is not taken as exogenous,
since it is likely to be a®ected by U.S. macroeconomic conditions. It will be, therefore, allowed
to depend on U.S. variables, as
y¤
t = ½¤y¤
t¡1 + ±yyt¡1 ¡ ±r(it¡1 ¡ ¼t¡1) + vt; (2.14)
5As the main focus in the empirical analysis lies in inferring the e®ect of global output on the U.S. economy,
I prefer here to avoid the risk of biasing the main coe±cients of interest by imposing cross-equation restrictions
from a potentially misspeci¯ed structural model for the foreign aggregate.8 FABIO MILANI
where the coe±cients ±y and ±r denote the sensitivity of global output to U.S. output and
real interest rates. The shock to global output is allowed to be AR(1) with autoregressive
coe±cient ½º and standard deviation ¾º.
Expectations are modeled as near-rational and denoted by ^ Et, which may di®er from model-
consistent rational expectations Et. The agents are assumed to form expectations using a
Perceived Law of Motion (PLM) of the economy that has the same structural form of the
model's Minimum State Variable (MSV) solution under rational expectations. It is assumed,
however, that economic agents are unable to observe the structural disturbances and that they
lack knowledge about the model parameters. Therefore, agents use the available historical data
to learn about the reduced-form coe±cients of the economy over time (similar expectations
formation mechanisms are extensively analyzed in Evans and Honkapohja, 2001).
















































































5 + et (2.15)
where et is a vector of residuals. Agents update their coe±cient estimates over time according
to the constant-gain algorithm
b Át = b Át¡1 + gR¡1
t Xt(Yt ¡ X0
tb Át¡1) (2.16)
Rt = Rt¡1 + g(XtX0
t ¡ Rt¡1) (2.17)
where Yt ´ [¼t;yt;it;y¤
t]











describes the updating of the learning rule coe±cients, and Rt the updating of the matrix of
second moments of the stacked regressors Xt. The coe±cient g denotes the constant gain,
which governs the rate at which agents discount past information when forming their beliefs.6
The learning algorithm needs to be initialized by choosing initial beliefs b Át=0 and Rt=0.
In the empirical analysis, these will not be arbitrarily chosen, but, as the estimation sample
will start from 1985, they will be inferred using pre-sample data from 1960:I to 1984:IV. It is
assumed that agents start the sample (in 1985:I) with initial beliefs that are also estimated
6There is experimental and time series evidence in support of similar models of learning as a reasonable
description of the economic agents' expectations formation mechanism. Adam (2007) shows that forecast rules
including lagged in°ation approximate the in°ation expectations of his experimental subjects. Branch and
Evans (2005) ¯nd that constant gain models of learning ¯t forecasts from surveys better than the alternatives
(such as models that use an optimal constant gain, the Kalman Filter, or Recursive Least Squares learning) for
both in°ation and output.GLOBAL OUTPUT AND U.S. INFLATION 9






















where ¿ denotes the last quarter of the pre-sample period. Hence, the estimation will not be
conditioned on a given chosen learning process, but the empirical analysis will try to extrapolate
the best-¯tting learning dynamics along with the best-¯tting structural and policy parameters
from time series data. The initial values of the vector of beliefs b Á¿ and the initial precision
matrix R¿, in fact, are not ¯xed, but their values will be inferred from the data by estimating
the constant gain parameter g (this is important since Carceles-Poveda and Giannitsarou, 2007,
show how di®erent initial beliefs may a®ect the dynamics of arti¯cially-simulated economies).
Therefore, there is only a single free parameter that is added in the model by introducing
learning.
Economic agents use (2.15) and the updated parameter estimates in (2.16) and (2.17),
obtained starting from initial beliefs (2.18) and (2.19), to form their expectations for t + 1 as
b Et¡1Yt+1 = at(1 + bt) + b2
tYt¡1; (2.20)
where it is assumed that agents dispose of information up to t¡1, when forming expectations
in t, and which can be substituted in (2.11) to (2.13) to obtain the Actual Law of Motion of
the economy (ALM):
»t = At + Ft»t¡1 + G$t (2.21)
Yt = H»t (2.22)
where »t = [Y 0
t;ut;´t;ºt]
0 is a vector of state variables, Yt is the vector of observable variables,
$t is a vector of Normally-distributed exogenous innovations, At is a vector of intercept terms,
Ft is a matrix of coe±cients that depends on structural and beliefs coe±cients, G collects the
standard deviations of the innovations, and H is a 4£7 matrix of zeros and ones, which simply
selects the observables from the vector of state variables »t; At and Ft are time-varying as an
implication of agents' real-time learning.
7Since economic agents learn using a constant gain in the model, it is assumed that also the initial beliefs
are derived in the same way, rather than by OLS. In this way, older observations are potentially discounted.10 FABIO MILANI
3. Structural Estimation
3.1. Data and Global Output Calculation. I use quarterly data on U.S. domestic in°a-
tion, U.S. output, the Federal Funds rate, and `global' output, as observable variables in the
estimation. In°ation is calculated as the log quarterly change in the GDP Implicit Price De-
°ator, output is obtained as log Real GDP, detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott ¯lter (with
¸ = 1;600), and the Federal Funds rate represents the monetary policy instrument in the
model.8 The sample spans the period from 1985:q1 to 2007:q1 (the starting date is chosen to
be consistent with Borio and Filardo, 2007, and Ihrig et al., 2007, and because a rapid increase
in the pace of globalization took place starting roughly from the mid-1980s).
To obtain the relevant measure of global output for the U.S. economy, I identify the largest
50 U.S. trading partners at the end of the sample and use quarterly data on their real GDP,
and their bilateral exports and imports with the U.S. over the sample (the data for the trading
partners have been obtained from IHS Global Insight).
9 All GDP, imports, and exports series
have been seasonally adjusted when already seasonally-adjusted series were not available.
For each country, I derive a detrended output series using the HP ¯lter. Global output y¤
t








where i = 1;:::;N is an index for the di®erent trading partners, yi
t is the detrended output of
trading partner i, and where the weights wi
t are given by the sum of U.S. imports and exports












Similar global output measures have been adopted by Borio and Filardo (2007), although they
use a changing weighted average of the top 10 trading partners, and by Ihrig et al. (2007),
8The U.S. data were obtained from FRED R °, the Federal Reserve of St. Louis Economic Database.
9Data are not always available for each of the 50 countries. In some cases, only annual GDP series are
available: these countries are dropped from the analysis. As they typically occupy positions between 35 and 50
in the trading partners' rankings, their omission is unlikely to have any sizeable e®ect on the results. Global
output is, therefore, calculated using data on about 40 countries: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Hong
Kong, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherland, Norway, New
Zealand, Philippines, Russia, South Africa, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, U.K.,
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who consider the top 35 partners. The large set of trading partners permits to account for
the in°uence of emerging market economies, which may be important in the recent part of the
sample. Moreover, the use of trade weights in the construction of global output is motivated
by the observation that bilateral trade °ows still represent the main source of global linkages
(e.g., Forbes and Chinn, 2004, and Frankel and Rose, 1998).
Figure 1 shows global output along with detrended U.S. output. The two series clearly
comove: their correlation is equal to 0.546, which remains nevertheless far from levels that
would create problems of near multicollinearity in the estimation.






The only parameter that is ¯xed is ¯, which is assumed equal to 0.99. The priors for the
other parameters (assumed to be independent) are speci¯ed in Table 1. For ·H, which denotes
the sensitivity of in°ation to domestic output, I assume a Gamma prior distribution with
mean 0.1 and standard deviation 0.08. The coe±cient regarding the e®ect of global output
on in°ation, denoted by ·F, follows a Normal prior distribution with mean 0 and standard
deviation 0.15, while the coe±cient regarding the e®ect of global output on domestic output,
denoted by #, follows a Normal prior distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation 0.5.
The priors incorporate sizeable uncertainty, as there is no clear-cut evidence about the value
of these coe±cients from previous studies; moreover, the priors are centered at zero, which will
be the value of ·F and # in the closed-economy New Keynesian model. I choose a Gamma
prior distribution with mean 1 and standard deviation 0.75 for ~ ¾, the sensitivity of domestic
output to the ex-ante real interest rate, and Normal distributions with mean 1.5 and standard
deviation 0.25 for the monetary policy reaction coe±cient to in°ation and with mean 0.25 and
standard deviation 0.125 for the reaction coe±cient to output. A non-informative Uniform
distribution is assumed for the constant-gain coe±cient (the estimation was also repeated,
however, under alternative Beta or Gamma prior distributions for the gain). Beta and inverse
gamma prior distributions are, ¯nally, selected for all autoregressive coe±cients in the model
and for the standard deviations of the shocks.12 FABIO MILANI
The model is estimated using Bayesian methods. The estimation techniques are reviewed
in An and Schorfheide (2008), for rational expectations models, and have been used to esti-
mate models with near-rational expectations and learning in Milani (2007a,b, 2008a,b) and
Slobodyan and Wouters (2007). Draws from the posterior distribution are generated using
the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. I run 600,000 draws, discarding the ¯rst 25% as initial
burn-in. Convergence is evaluated by looking at trace plots, CUSUM plots, and performing
the tests proposed by Geweke (1992) and Raftery and Lewis (1995);10 I use bivariate scatter
plots to assess the mixing of the chain and to check whether strong dependence exists among
some parameters.
4. Empirical Results
4.1. Posterior Estimates. Table 2 reports the posterior mean estimates for the structural
coe±cients in £ along with the corresponding 95% highest posterior density (HPD) intervals.
The ¯rst three columns (columns (1a), (1b), and (1c) in the table) refer to the baseline model,
described by equations (2.11) to (2.14), in which global output is allowed to have an e®ect on the
aggregate demand and supply of the economy and on the formation of expectations, through
the PLM (2.15). The posterior mean estimate for the sensitivity of in°ation to global output
·F is equal to -0.015 (column 1a). In reduced-form in°ation regressions, Borio and Filardo
(2007) estimate this sensitivity to be positive, signi¯cant, and relatively large. The estimates
in the structural model, instead, point to small and slightly negative coe±cients: this evidence
is, therefore, more consistent with the estimates in Ihrig et al. (2007), who also often obtain
negative elasticities (equal to -0.048 in their baseline U.S. estimation, with a large standard
error), and with the theoretical arguments in Woodford (2007), who discusses how negative
signs may be more natural within the model. The 95% HPD interval is rather large and
contain the value of zero for the elasticity. The estimate for #, instead, falls entirely in positive
range and has posterior mean equal to 0.558. The posterior mean for the elasticity of in°ation
to domestic output ·H equals 0.015, while the posterior mean for the elasticity of domestic
output to the ex-ante real interest rate is equal to 0.096. The estimates of the monetary policy








j=D1+1 g (£j) obtained
from the ¯rst D1 and last D2 simulation draws. The null hypothesis of equal means can then be tested using









=) N(0;1), for D ! 1. Raftery and Lewis (1995)'s
diagnostics, instead, suggests a minimum number of total draws, a thinning parameter, and a minimum burn-in,
by computing the autocorrelation of the draws.GLOBAL OUTPUT AND U.S. INFLATION 13
rule coe±cients are in line with the existing evidence (½ = 0:91, Â¼ = 1:421, and Ây = 0:39).
The estimate of the constant gain coe±cient falls on the low side: the posterior mean for g is
0.011. A low value for the gain coe±cient is expected since there is evidence that its value is
lower in the post-1985 sample than in the previous decades (see Milani, 2007b), as periods of
turbulence in the economy, which typically lead agents to increase their gain coe±cient, have
been far less frequent.
It is important to notice that learning seems able to capture most of the persistence in the
model. The autoregressive coe±cient for the exogenous cost-push shock ut is, in fact, estimated
equal to 0.076. This suggests that when the existing in°ation inertia is fully captured, the role
of global output as a signi¯cant determinant of in°ation is diminished. Estimations that fail
to account for the inertial adjustment of expectations may hence overestimate the importance
of those variables { such as global output { that can capture the omitted inertia.
Finally, there seems to be evidence against the assumption of exogeneity of global output
to the U.S. business cycle: global output, in fact, depends positively on past U.S. output
(±y = 0:207) and negatively on past U.S. real interest rates (±r = 0:077).11
The evidence about the role of global output seems robust to alternative assumptions about
the learning rule. In the baseline model, economic agents were assumed to know the steady
state of the variables (i.e., they recognize that at = 0 for all t's), although they were learning
about the parameters of the model. This assumption can be relaxed and the new estimation
results are reported in column (1b) in the table: economic agents now need to learn about
the steady states as well (i.e., they also estimate a vector of intercept terms at). Column (1c),
instead, refers to the case in which economic agents are assumed to start the sample with an
initial belief that global output does not a®ect domestic variables (rather than leaving this belief







t=0 = 0, but they update their beliefs as new data become available. In both cases, the results
remain very similar. In the learning about the steady state case, the mean estimate for ·F
remains negative and equal to -0.019, while the estimate for # is unchanged (as learning about
the intercept seems to matter more in the in°ation equation than in the output equation).
When the initial beliefs assign a zero weight to global output, the estimated value for # is
reduced (# = 0:349) and the posterior estimate for ·F is still negative (·F = ¡0:012).
11The model has also been re-estimated taking global output as exogenous. The ¯t of the model becomes
substantially worse. The estimates of the main coe±cients of interest remain similar.14 FABIO MILANI
So far, I have assumed that global output a®ects both the determination of output and
in°ation in the model and formation of economic agents' expectations, through their PLM
(2.15). The e®ects of globalization, however, may not have been incorporated yet in the
expectations formation of agents. Hence, I repeat the estimation allowing global output to







t , are now all equal to zero in the PLM for all t's). Again, the resulting estimates (reported
in column (2) of Table 2) are absolutely similar (·F = ¡0:023, # = 0:322).
The best-¯tting values of the gain coe±cient are somewhat dependent on the learning rule
speci¯cation (ranging from 0.006 when agents need to learn about the constant and the e®ect
of global output as well, to 0.035 when they know the steady state and simply use a VAR
in in°ation, domestic output, and interest rates). For the purposes of the paper, however,
even under di®erent constant gain values and PLM speci¯cations, the estimates regarding the
e®ects of global output remain remarkably similar.
The evidence on the role of domestic and global economic conditions in the Phillips curve is,
in fact, not particularly sensitive to the speci¯c assumptions about economic agents' learning
rules. Figure 2 shows the posterior distributions for the coe±cients denoting the sensitivity of
in°ation to domestic output ·H and the sensitivity of in°ation to global output ·F, across the
di®erent estimated models in Table 2. The shapes of the distributions remain similar across
all cases; the distributions for ·F are substantially more di®use, which can help explain the
di±culty in pinning down the value of this parameter in the literature.
4.2. Posterior Odds Ratios. To assess whether it would be desirable for macroeconomic
models of the U.S. economy to be revised to incorporate a role for global output, I can com-
pare the ¯t to the data of the baseline speci¯cation compared with the ¯t of alternative spec-
i¯cations in which some of the channels through which global output a®ects the system are
shut down. Table 2 reports the posterior odds ratios among the estimated models, calculated
with respect to the baseline model with global output, whose estimates are shown in column
(1a).12 Requiring agents to also learn about the steady state levels of the variables leads to a
worsening in the model ¯t. A substantial improvement is, instead, obtained by assuming that
agents start the sample in 1985 with an initial belief that global output has a zero e®ect on
12The log marginal likelihoods are computed using Geweke's modi¯ed harmonic mean estimator. According
to Je®reys (1961), strong evidence of one model speci¯cation versus the other is typically obtained when the
ratios are above 10; posterior odds ratios above 100 are typically considered decisive evidence.GLOBAL OUTPUT AND U.S. INFLATION 15
domestic variables, which means that they didn't include global output in their PLM in the
1960-1984 period (the posterior odds ratio with respect to the baseline model is 41.6). If the
expectations channel is shut down (by assuming that global output does not a®ect the agents'
PLM at all t's), the model ¯t further improves: the posterior odds ratio in this case is 345.5.
Therefore, the data strongly suggest that U.S. expectations respond to domestic conditions,
but not (yet) to global developments.
Figure 3 illustrates the evolution of economic agents' beliefs under the alternative learning
assumptions. If global output is included in the PLM for domestic variables, the perceived
e®ect is often negative in the sample (with an estimated initial belief close to zero in the
in°ation equation, and negative in the output equation). As seen, ¯xing the initial beliefs
to zero or dropping global output from the PLM improves the model's ¯t. The best-¯tting
speci¯cation is characterized by a more rapidly declining perceived persistence in in°ation
compared with the other cases, by a lower perceived persistence in output, by a belief of a
more aggressive monetary policy reaction at the beginning of the sample, which drops in the
second half, and by a lower perceived policy reaction to output deviations.
To test if global output plays any role for the U.S. economy, I also estimate a closed-economy






t = 0 in the PLM.
The model ¯ts the data better than the baseline model with global output (posterior odds
ratio = 393.07). The ¯t of the closed economy model, however, is comparable to the ¯t of
the alternative model in which global output is allowed to a®ect the economy, but not the
formation of expectations. The slight prevalence of the closed economy model in Table 2 is
sensitive to assumptions about the priors: if the model is re-estimated assuming a less di®use
prior distribution for # (with standard deviation equal to 0.25, for example), or one with a
positive prior mean (equal to 0.25, for example), the relative ¯t of the two models would be
reversed. The data, therefore, cannot clearly favor one speci¯cation over the other.
The model is ¯nally re-estimated by ¯xing in turn either ·F or # equal to zero. The estimates
are shown in column (4) and (5) in the table. The estimation results suggest a role for global
output °uctuations in a®ecting domestic output through the IS equation; the e®ect of global
output on marginal costs and hence on in°ation does not seem, however, central in ¯tting
the data (as including it leads to a worse ¯t than the closed-economy speci¯cation). The
speci¯cation with ·F = 0 and # 6= 0, in fact, attains the highest ¯t among all the estimated16 FABIO MILANI
models, with a posterior odds ratio of 2,599.31. In this case, the model rankings are robust to
di®erent choices about the prior distributions: extending the IS curve to allow for an e®ect of
global output improves the ¯t, while altering the Phillips curve appears to worsen it.
4.3. Impulse Responses and Variance Decomposition. Even if the direct e®ect of global
output on in°ation is unimportant, global output can still have potentially important e®ects
on in°ation through its estimated in°uence on domestic output.
Figure 4 displays the impulse responses of the domestic in°ation rate to one standard de-
viation positive shocks to both domestic and global output, obtained for the model in which
global output is assumed not to enter the agents' PLM (this case is selected as it is the best-
¯tting speci¯cation among those that allow for a role of global output in column (1a) through
(2) in Table 2). The impulse responses are time-varying in the sample as a result of learning
dynamics: the ¯gure shows the median impulse response functions over the sample, along with
16% and 84% percentile bands (no clear pattern is apparent from the time variation in the
impulse responses, which is modest). Shocks to domestic output have a sluggish e®ect on
in°ation. The response of in°ation to shocks to global output is substantially smaller: the
impact is initially negative and then it turns positive after few quarters. Global output shocks
have a positive e®ect on domestic output with a peak after two-three quarters.
The contribution of global output to the domestic economy is, however, limited. The fore-
cast error variance decomposition indicates that shocks to global output can account for only
1% of the °uctuations in domestic in°ation at ¯ve or ten-year horizons (while the variance
share explained by domestic output shocks reaches 20%), and for 9% of the domestic output
°uctuations (median values over the sample). The other direction of causality is probably
stronger: shocks to U.S. output can explain roughly 30% of °uctuations in the global output
variable.
Finally, although the e®ect of global output is still relatively small, the openness of the U.S.
economy may change the transmission of domestic shocks. Figure 5 shows the response of
U.S. in°ation and output to domestic shocks, i.e. the response of in°ation to a one standard
deviation shock to domestic output and the response of output to a one standard deviation
contractionary monetary policy shock. The impulse responses are shown in the cases in which
the economy is open (the speci¯cation refers to column (2) in Table 2) and in which the same
economy is, instead, closed (by setting ·F and # equal to zero). The comparison is importantGLOBAL OUTPUT AND U.S. INFLATION 17
since, even though the data favor the closed economy speci¯cation, the ¯t of the two models
is still similar (the posterior model probabilities would be 0.532 for the closed economy and
0.468 for the open economy speci¯cation in column (2)) and their relative ¯t is dependent on
the prior selections. It is hence necessary to check whether omitting open economy features
would lead to a serious misspeci¯cation of the dynamics of U.S. variables.
The evidence, however, suggests that the response of output to a monetary policy shock is
largely similar in the open and closed economy case, given the estimated parameters (Boivin
and Giannoni, 2008, similarly ¯nd that global forces have not signi¯cantly changed the trans-
mission of U.S. monetary policy shocks). This ¯nding reinforces the argument that the ef-
fectiveness of national monetary policies has not been compromised by globalization. The
response of in°ation to a domestic demand shock is somewhat attenuated in the open economy
scenario compared with the closed economy case. The di®erences, however, are again small.
4.4. Does Taking Global Output Into Account Improve Forecasting? Is information
about global output developments helpful in forecasting future domestic in°ation and output
values? The last rows of table 2 show the forecasting performance, expressed by the Mean
Absolute Error (MAE) in the 1985-2007 sample, of economic agents that learn using the
di®erent PLMs of the economy.
Agents obtain the best forecasting performance for in°ation using a PLM in which they are
assumed to have knowledge about the intercept, and to disregard information about global
output (the speci¯cations estimated in column (2) to (5) lead to lower MAEs). Global output,
therefore, doesn't seem particularly helpful in improving in°ation forecasting outcomes. As
regards output forecasting, instead, the PLM that includes global output as a regressor, but
starting from initial beliefs about its e®ects that equal zero in 1985, outperforms the other
learning rules (MAE = 0.500). Models without global output do somewhat worse, and models
in which global output enters the PLM with initial beliefs about its e®ect estimated from pre-
sample data have the worst forecasting record. The conclusions from the forecasting exercise
match those obtained from the in-sample model comparison: there is some evidence of a role
of global output in a®ecting domestic output, but no clear role of global output on in°ation.18 FABIO MILANI
5. Conclusions
Various research papers, policy speeches, and press articles have suggested that the increased
global integration of national economies may have led to radical changes in the behavior of
in°ation, even in large economies as the U.S.
This paper has estimated a two-country general equilibrium model with focus on the U.S.
to identify the impact of global output on domestic in°ation. The results do not provide
supportive evidence for abandoning the conventional closed-economy Phillips curve in favor
of one in which global output replaces domestic output as the main variable driving U.S.
in°ation. When expectations are modeled within a general equilibrium setting and the inertia
of in°ation is fully captured, there doesn't appear to remain a role left for measures of global
output as a signi¯cant regressor in the U.S. Phillips curve. There is also no evidence that
global output has had an important in°uence through the formation of agents' expectations.
Global output can still a®ect in°ation, though, as it is found to have a positive spillover e®ect
on domestic output. But the overall e®ect is not large. Thus, the empirical results imply that,
so far, globalization is unlikely to have substantially altered the conduct and the e®ectiveness
of domestic monetary policy.
There are other possible e®ects of globalization, however, that have been ignored in the
current paper. Globalization may have more radically a®ected the structure of the models that
we use. As one example, the Calvo parameter in the model, which in°uences the frequency
of price changes is typically regarded as exogenous; but it may be argued that it is actually
endogenous and that it may vary with the extent of openness to trade. Extending the model to
capture all possible channels through which globalization can a®ect the U.S. economy remains
an important direction for future research.GLOBAL OUTPUT AND U.S. INFLATION 19
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Prior Distribution
Description Parameter Distr. Support Prior Mean 95% Prior Prob. Interval
Discount Factor ¯ - - 0.99 -
Sensit. In°. to Dom. Output ·
H ¡ R
+ 0.1 [0.007,0.30]
Sensit. In°. to Global Output ·
F N R 0 [-0.29,-0.29]
Sensit. Output to Global Output # N R 0 [-0.98,0.98]
Sensit. Output to Int. Rate ~ ¾ ¡ R
+ 1 [0.099,2.91]
MP Inertia ½ B [0,1] 0.8 [0.57-0.95]
MP In°ation feedback Â¼ N R 1.5 [1.01-1.99]
MP Output Gap feedback Ây N R 0.25 [0.01-0.49]
AR coe®. ut ½u B [0,1] 0.5 [0.11-0.89]
AR coe®. ´t ½´ B [0,1] 0.5 [0.11-0.89]
AR coe®. ºt ½º B [0,1] 0.5 [0.11-0.89]
Std. Cost-Push Shock ¾u ¡
¡1 R
+ 0.5 [0.1,1.94]
Std. Demand Shock ¾´ ¡
¡1 R
+ 0.5 [0.1,1.94]
Std. MP Shock ¾" ¡
¡1 R
+ 0.5 [0.1,1.94]
Std. Global Output Shock ¾º ¡
¡1 R
+ 0.5 [0.1,1.94]
E®ect of US Output on Y
¤
t ±y N R 0 [-0.98,0.98]
E®ect of US Real Rate on Y
¤





¤ B [0,1] 0.7 [0.47,0.89]
Constant Gain g U [0,0.2] 0.1 [0.005,0.195]
Table 1 - Prior Distributions.
Note: ¡= Gamma, N= Normal, B= Beta, ¡
¡1= Inverse Gamma, U= Uniform,22 FABIO MILANI
Posterior Means and 95% HPD Intervals
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Description Param. Baseline Model Learning about s.s. b
¢;y¤
0 = 0 No y
¤ in PLM Closed Economy ·
F = 0 # = 0







































































































































































































































































Posterior Odds 1 0.364 41.6 345.5 393.07 2,599.31 115.93
Forecasting
MAE for ¼t in agents' PLM 0.1828 0.1835 0.1827 0.1821 0.1822 0.1821 0.1822
MAE for yt in agents' PLM 0.512 0.517 0.500 0.5069 0.5074 0.5069 0.5072
Table 2 - Empirical Results: Posterior Estimates. The main entries denote posterior mean estimates, while
the numbers below in brackets denote 95% Highest Posterior Density (HPD) intervals.GLOBAL OUTPUT AND U.S. INFLATION 23













Figure 1. U.S. and \Global" Output series.
Note: Data from 1985:q1 to 2007:q1 are used in the estimation of the structural model. Data from 1960:q1
to 1984:q4 are used to calculate initial values for the agents' beliefs at the beginning of the estimation sample.24 FABIO MILANI




Posterior Distribution: Sensitivity of Inflation to Domestic Output, κ
H















Figure 2. Posterior Distibutions for the sensitivity of in°ation to domestic
output and to global output coe±cients ·H and ·F, across di®erent model and
learning speci¯cations.
Note: (1a), (1b), (1c), (2), and (3) in the graph refer to the corresponding speci¯cations whose estimates are















































































































Figure 3. Evolution of economic agents' beliefs over the sample, across di®er-
ent estimated PLM speci¯cations.
Note: the dotted red line refers to the model with global output in the PLM with initial beliefs about its
e®ect estimated from pre-sample data (case (1a) in the table), the dashed green line refers to the model with
global output in the PLM with initial beliefs about its e®ect ¯xed at zero (case (1c) in the table), and the blue
line refers to the model in which global output is omitted from the PLM of the domestic variables (case (2) in
the table).26 FABIO MILANI







Response of Domestic Inflation






Response of Domestic Output
Shock to Domestic Output
Shock to Global Output
Shock to Domestic Output
Shock to Global Output
Figure 4. Impulse response functions of domestic in°ation and output to one
standard deviation shocks to global output and to domestic output.
Note: The ¯gure shows the median impulse responses across the sample (denoted by the solid blue line for
the response to the domestic shock, and by the dashed red line for the response to the global shock), along with
16% and 84% percentile error bands (dotted lines).GLOBAL OUTPUT AND U.S. INFLATION 27







IRF of Domestic Inflation to Domestic Demand Shock










Figure 5. Impulse response functions of domestic variables to domestic shocks
in closed versus open economy scenario.
Note: The ¯gure shows the median impulse responses across the sample (the dashed green line indicates
the median responses of domestic variables in the open economy case, while the solid red line indicates the
median responses of domestic variables if the same economy was closed); dotted and dash-dotted lines denote
the respective 16% and 84% percentile error bands.